The Jeeves Test

What is a browser for? What should it do, or not do? What should it be?

People within the Mozilla project have been recently discussing the user value of some new features in Firefox. I think a person’s view of questions of this nature will depend on their view of the role of the browser. One option is the “featureless window on the web” view – the browser is nothing, the site is everything. But as one participant said, this leads to all the value-add and features being provided by the sites, which is not a recipe for user control, or for using the browser to advance the Mozilla mission.

I think the best vision for Firefox is as your “Internet butler” – quiet and refined, highly capable, provides what you need even before you know you need it, who gently guides you out of trouble but generally does his thing without you needing to think about him or provide explicit direction or management.

Bertie using an early voice interface prototype

So I’d like to propose the “Jeeves Test” for evaluating feature proposals for Firefox. It works like this: imagine Bertie Wooster, relaxing in an armchair in his apartment, with a cigarette, a gin and tonic, and a tablet computer. Then take the user value proposition of an idea, write it in appropriately deferential language, and see if you can imagine Jeeves whispering it into his ear. If you can’t, perhaps it’s not something we want to do.

To make that a bit more concrete, here are some examples of things that might pass: “Here’s an English translation of this Serbian page, sir”, or “For your safety, sir, access to this malware page has been blocked”. And here are some which might not: “For your convenience, sir, I’ve exempted aol.com from your popup blocker”, or “You’ll be pleased to find, sir, that the user interface has been substantially rearranged”.

There may be occasions where we’d want to do something which doesn’t obviously pass the Jeeves Test, if the effects on the broader web ecosystem of making the change are significantly positive. Some of the things we do to improve web security but which have a short-term compatibility impact might fall into that category. “Let me ensure this site doesn’t load for you, sir” generally doesn’t go down well, after all. But in those cases, that longer-term or broader value has to be clearly articulated – before we make the change – if we are to avoid an exasperated “Dash it, Jeeves… why?” from our userbase.